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The FAO Multilateral System for Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture: Better than 
Bilateralism?  
Muriel Lightbourne  
INTRODUCTION 
Agriculture is deemed to have appeared roughly ten thousand 
years ago, disrupting the existing ecological balance, and allowing 
human population growth to take off.
1
 Not all societies gave up 
pastoralism; however, agriculture gradually spread across the world. 
As explained by Jose Esquinas-Alcázar, ―the process of 
domesticating plants and animals and the spread of agriculture were 
slow enough to allow a new equilibrium to emerge . . . . Genetic 
diversity was maintained, and even increased, during this long 
period; the heterogeneous varieties developed by farmers in each 
location became well-adapted to varying local conditions.‖2 The 
repeated selection by farmers of wild plants altered the genotypes of 
these plants, ―and substantially added value to them.‖3 This pattern of 
farmers developing landraces is still prevalent in many developing 
countries, even where some features of modern agriculture can be 
found. However, since World War II, farmers in many developing 
and industrialized countries have become reliant on public breeders 
and private seed-processors for their supply of quality seeds. Since 
 
  Copyright © 2008. Formerly Visiting Scholar, University of Illinois at Urbana–
Champaign College of Law.  
 1. STEVE OLSON, MAPPING HUMAN HISTORY: DISCOVERING THE PAST THROUGH OUR 
GENES 101 (2002). 
 2. José Esquinas-Alcázar, Protecting Crop Genetic Diversity for Food Security: 
Political, Ethical and Technical Challenges, 6 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 946, 947 (2005). 
 3. Clive Stannard, Niek van der Graaff, Alan Randell, Peter Lallas & Peter Kenmore, 
Agricultural Biological Diversity for Food Security: Shaping International Initiatives to Help 
Agriculture and the Environment, 48 HOW. L.J. 397, 402 (2004). 
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the 1980s, private breeders (seed companies) and, to a lesser extent, 
public agricultural research centers have embraced the 
biotechnological revolution. Hence, since the Green Revolution and 
the advent of biotechnologies, the modern agricultural system has 
been based on genetically uniform high-yielding crop varieties. The 
sustainability of such a system is at stake, owing to the loss of genetic 
diversity that ensues. Esquinas-Alcázar shows that of the more than 
300,000 vascular plants
4
 identified, roughly 7,000 species have been 
used to satisfy basic human needs.
5
 However, ―[b]arely more than 
150 species are now cultivated; most of mankind now lives off no 
more than 12 plant species.‖6 In such conditions, access to genetic 
resources is necessary, not only for traditional farmers but also for 
industrial public and private breeders, in order to maintain some 
genetic variability.  
In 1983, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (―FAO‖) adopted the International Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources (―IUPGR‖).7 The IUPGR was a non-legally 
binding instrument based on the assumption that plant genetic 
resources were the common heritage of mankind and should be freely 
exchanged.
8
 The rationale for adopting the IUPGR was that full 
advantage could be derived from plant genetic resources through an 
effective program of plant breeding, so as to avoid erosion and loss of 
these resources.
9
 
The IUPGR could not be adopted as a binding instrument due to 
the reservations of eight industrialized countries. As of December 
1997, the IUPGR had gained the support of 113 parties, with Brazil, 
Canada, China, Japan, Malaysia, and the United States as notable 
exceptions. Unsurprisingly, these same countries, joined by Australia, 
often adopted hard stances during the negotiations of the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
 
 4. Vascular plants are those having a system of conducting tissues to transport water, 
mineral salts, and sugar (i.e., angiosperms, gymnosperms, ferns, but not mosses nor algae). 
 5. Esquinas-Alcázar, supra note 2, at 947. 
 6. Id. 
 7. International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, FAO Res. 8/83 (Nov. 23, 
1983), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/Res/C8-83E.pdf [hereinafter IUPGR]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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Agriculture (―International Treaty‖),10 while Japan and the United 
States declined to become signatories.  
New conditions have prevailed over the transfer of plant genetic 
resources since the Convention on Biological Diversity (―CBD‖) was 
opened for signature in Rio de Janeiro and entered into force in 
December 1993.
11
 The CBD reaffirms the sovereignty of U.N. 
Member States over their natural resources.
12
 This conflicted with the 
common heritage principle embodied in the IUPGR.
13
 The latter 
placed no restrictions on access to these resources, while the former 
allows governments to impose controls and conditions.
14
 This 
reversal can be explained by the fact that developing countries have 
realized the market value of by-products or processes using their 
biological resources, especially in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Owing to the interdependency of countries with respect to food 
supplies, the rising awareness of environmental and health concerns 
constraining food production, and the growing role played by 
intellectual property rights in the field of agriculture, the international 
community needed a binding agreement organizing seed exchanges. 
The International Treaty was adopted after eight years of negotiations 
and superseded the IUPGR.
15
 It entered into force in June 2004.
16
 
The International Treaty covers all plant genetic resources.
17
 
 
 10. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, adopted 
Nov. 3, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. No. 110–19, http://www.fao.org/AG/cgrfa/itpgr.htm [hereinafter 
International Treaty]. 
 11. Convention on Biological Diversity (with annexes), opened for signature June 5, 
1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-un-en.pdf [hereinafter 
CBD]. 
 12. Id. at pmbl. 
 13. IUPGR, supra note 7, at pmbl. 
 14. CBD, supra note 11, at pmbl.; IUPGR, supra note 7, at pmbl. 
 15. International Treaty, supra note 10. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. art. II. Under the treaty, ―‗[p]lant genetic resources for food and agriculture‘ means 
any genetic material of plant origin of actual or potential value for food and agriculture,‖ and 
―‗[g]enetic material‘ means any material of plant origin, including reproductive and vegetative 
propagating material, containing functional units of heredity.‖ Id. The definition contained in 
the former International Undertaking in Plant Genetic Resources was sweeping, encompassing 
cultivars ―in current use and newly developed varieties[,] obsolete cultivars[,] primitive 
cultivars (land races)[,] wild and weed species . . . [, and] special genetic stocks (including elite 
and current breeders‘ line and mutants).‖ IUPGR, supra note 7, at art II. This gives the 
background for the adoption of FAO Resolution 4/89. FAO resolutions 4/89, 5/89, and 3/91 
were annexed to the IUPGR. They respectively affirm the compatibility of plant breeders‘ 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Article 5 promotes ―an integrated approach to the exploration, 
conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture.‖18 In particular, on-farm and in situ conservation is 
encouraged, and so is the coordination of efforts in ex situ 
conservation. One of the proclaimed goals is ―broadening the genetic 
base of crops and increasing the range of genetic diversity available 
to farmers.‖19 The International Treaty creates a Multilateral System 
that covers all plant genetic resources ―listed in Annex I that are 
under the control of the Contracting Parties and in the public 
domain‖20 and those genetic resources listed in Annex I that are held 
in ex situ collections of the International Agricultural Research 
Centers (―IARCs‖) of the Consultative Group of the International 
Agricultural Research (―CGIAR‖).21 Annex I lists sixty-four genera 
 
rights with the multilateral system, recognize farmers‘ rights, and recognize nations‘ sovereign 
rights over their genetic resources. Agreed Interpretation of the International Undertaking, FAO 
Res. 4/89, U.N. FAO, 25th Sess. (Nov. 29, 1989); Farmers‘ Rights, FAO Res. 5/89, U.N. FAO, 
25th Sess. (Nov. 29, 1989); Resolution 5/91, FAO Res. 5/91, U.N. FAO, 26th Sess. (Nov. 25, 
1991). 
 Resolution 5/89 defines farmers‘ rights as ―rights arising from the past, present and future 
contributions of farmers in conserving, improving, and making available plant genetic 
resources, particularly those in the centres of origin/diversity.‖ Farmers‘ Rights, supra. The 
recognition of farmers‘ rights in Resolution 5/89 was intended to ―ensure that the need for 
conservation is globally recognized and that sufficient funds for [those] purposes [would] be 
available,‖ and to allow farmers to benefit from the improved use of plant genetic resources. Id. 
 18. International Treaty, supra note 10, art. 5.1. 
 19. Id. art. 6.2(d). 
 20. Id. art. 11.2. 
 21. Id. art. 11.5. The Rockefeller Foundation financed the first ex situ collection of wheat 
and maize germplasm, and established the CGIAR in 1971. The FAO, the United Nations 
Program for Development, the United Nations Program for Environment, and the World Bank 
now participate in the financing of the CGIAR, which federates sixteen collections and research 
centers, also called Future Harvest Centers (some of which, like the International Rice Research 
Institute, were created before the CGIAR). Countries freely contribute genetic resources to the 
CGIAR‘s centers, and anyone can ask for free samples for research or breeding programs. The 
review conducted in 1986 by the FAO on the legal status of existing collections observed that 
control over the CGIAR centers was shared between national and international representatives 
and that the ownership of these collections was not clear. Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., 
Comm‘n on Plant Genetic Res., Legal Status of Base and Active Collections of Plant Genetic 
Resources, ¶ 61, FAO Doc. CPGR/87/5 (Dec. 1986)).  
 Later, the CGIAR‘s Ethical Principles Relating to Genetic Resources (1998) declared that 
the collections were being held in trust for the world community, with a view to increasing food 
security and alleviating poverty. CGIAR SYSTEM-WIDE GENETIC RESOURCES PROGRAMME, 
BOOKLET OF CGIAR CENTRE POLICY INSTRUMENTS, GUIDELINES AND STATEMENTS ON 
GENETIC RESOURCES, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VERSION I 28–
29 (2001), http://www.cglrc.cgiar.org/icraf/lawPolicyPltGenRes/Policy_Booklet_Version1.pdf 
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of crops and forages (thirty-five of which are food crops).
22
 The 
―crops on the list already cover about eighty percent of the world‘s 
food-calorie intake from plants.‖23 The Multilateral System can also 
apply, on a voluntary basis, to plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture (―PGRFAs‖) held by ―natural and legal persons‖ within 
the jurisdiction of the contracting parties, and to those held in 
international institutions other than the CGIAR with which the 
Governing Body for the International Treaty (―IT‖) will have 
concluded agreements for the purposes of the International Treaty.
24
 
Thus, there are three categories of PGRFAs concerned: (1) those 
listed and held in public collections of IT Member States; (2) those 
listed and held in collections of the CGIAR; and, on a voluntary 
basis, (3) those held by other international institutions or by natural or 
legal persons who are under the jurisdiction of contracting parties.  
The Multilateral System is premised on the principle that benefits 
accruing from the PGRFAs it covers ―shall be shared fairly and 
equitably through the following mechanisms: the exchange of 
information, access to and transfer of technology, capacity-building, 
and the sharing of the benefits arising from commercialization.‖25 
Contracting Parties undertake to ―facilitate access to technologies for 
the conservation, characterization, evaluation and use‖ of the 
PGRFAs that are under the Multilateral System.
26
 Article 13.2(b)(ii)–
(iii) indicates that transfers of technology include all types of 
partnerships in research and development or commercial joint-
 
[hereinafter BOOKLET]. In October 1994, the FAO and eleven CGIAR centres depositaries of ex 
situ collections signed agreements placing collections of plant germplasm under the auspices of 
the FAO and instituted an International Network of Ex Situ Collections, ―for the benefit of the 
international community, in particular the developing countries.‖ Id. at 21. A 1994 Joint 
Statement of FAO and the CGIAR Centres on the Agreement Placing CGIAR Germplasm 
Collections under the Auspices of FAO contains clarifications as to the interpretation of some 
terms of the Agreement. Id. at 8–9. A Second Joint Statement, adopted in 1998, acknowledges 
that violations by the recipients of germplasm of the prohibition from seeking intellectual 
property rights may occur, and it provides for proceedings to remedy such instances. Id. at 10–
12. Ex situ collections are collections (gene banks, botanical gardens, etc.) of ―components of 
biological diversity outside their natural habitats.‖ CBD, supra note 11, art. 2. 
 22. International Treaty, supra note 10, at Annex 1. 
 23. Stannard et al., supra note 3, at 413. 
 24. International Treaty, supra note 10, art. 11. 
 25. Id. art. 13.2. 
 26. Id. art. 13.2(b)(i). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ventures relating to the material received from the Multilateral 
System, ―consistent with the adequate and effective protection of 
intellectual property rights.‖27 
Article 13.2(d)(ii) constitutes the cornerstone of the Multilateral 
System. It posits that commercializing products that are PGRFAs and 
incorporating genetic material accessed from the Multilateral System 
triggers the payment of a contribution to the benefit sharing system, 
except where such products are available without restriction to others 
for further research and breeding.
28
 
Because innovation cycles in the plant breeding industry require 
five to fifteen years to create new stable varieties, the Multilateral 
System will not start producing effects for a few more years. 
However, the share of benefits derived from the commercialization of 
plant genetic resources that incorporate genetic material accessed 
from the Multilateral System should be fairly limited pursuant to the 
provisions of the Standard Material Transfer Agreement (―SMTA‖) 
adopted by the International Treaty Governing Body in June 2006.
29
 
This seems to vindicate the position of China and Ethiopia, which 
consisted of maintaining soybean and coffee outside the Multilateral 
System. Part I of this Article will show that such is not the case. Part 
 
 27. Id. art. 13.2(b)(ii)–(iii). 
 28. Id. art. 13.2(d)(ii). 
 29. The STMA was adopted by Resolution 2/2006 of the Governing Body of the 
International Treaty during its first meeting held in Madrid in June 2006. Food & Agric. Org. of 
the U.N., Report of the Governing Body of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture, First Session, ¶ 12, FAO Doc. IT/GB-1/06/Report (June 12–16, 
2006). Article 6.7 of the SMTA provides that ―[i]n the case that the recipient commercializes a 
Product that is a Plant Genetic Resource for Food and Agriculture and that incorporates 
Material [received from the MLS], and where such Product is not available without restriction 
to others for further research and breeding,‖ the recipient shall pay 1.1% of the gross income 
resulting from the commercialization of the product less 30%, except where the product is 
traded as a commodity. Standard Material Transfer Agreement, art. 6.7, June 16, 2006, 
available at http://www.planttreaty.org/smta_en.htm [hereinafter SMTA]. The gross income 
taken into consideration results from the commercialization of the product by the recipient, its 
affiliates, contractors, licensees and lessees. Id. at Annex 2. An alternative scheme was 
proposed by the African group and accepted, under Article 6.11. Irrespective of whether the 
product is available without restrictions, or whether it was developed using material accessed 
from the MLS, the recipient may opt for an alternative scheme. Id. art. 6.11. The recipient shall 
then make payments at the discounted rate of 0.5% of the sales of the product that is a PGRFA 
belonging to the same crop as one of those listed under Annex I to the International Treaty, 
during a period of ten years, which can be extended by periods of five years. Id. art. 6.11, 
Annex I.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/14
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II will then focus on the nature of the SMTA and compare its features 
to those of the GNU General Public License, with a particular focus 
on materials under development and benefit-sharing provisions. This 
Article suggests that, in order to avoid hold-up situations further 
down the road in the innovation process and high transaction costs, 
materials developed by public international research centers should 
not be protected by intellectual property rights, whose impact on the 
implementation of the International Treaty is analyzed in Part III. It 
concludes that the International Treaty is better than its alternative, 
i.e., a cluster of bilateral agreements. 
I. WHAT ALTERNATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY? 
Plants held in private or public collections of countries which are 
not parties to the International Treaty are governed by the CBD, as 
are other biological resources. Similarly, pursuant to the International 
Treaty‘s Article 15.3, the material other than that listed in Annex I, 
which is received and conserved by an International Agricultural 
Research Center (―IARC‖) of the CGIAR under the International 
Treaty, ―shall be available for access on terms consistent with those 
mutually agreed between the IARC‘s . . . and the country of origin of 
such resources . . . in accordance with the [CBD] or other applicable 
law.‖30 
The situation was initially different for plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture other than those listed in Annex I of the 
International Treaty and collected before its entry into force that are 
held by IARCs. Article 15.1(b) requires that they be made available 
in accordance with the provisions of the Material Transfer Agreement 
(―MTA‖) that was in use pursuant to agreements between the IARCs 
and the FAO, until a new Model MTA is adopted by the Governing 
Body at its second session.
31
 A quick review of these agreements is in 
order. 
 
 30. International Treaty, supra note 10, art. 15.3. 
 31. Id. art. 15.1(b). The model MTA considered under Article 15 of the Treaty differs in 
principle from the standard MTA referred to in Article 12.4. Further, pursuant to Article 
15.1(b)(ii), ―[t]he Contracting Parties in whose territory the plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture were collected from in situ conditions shall be provided with samples of such plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture on demand, without any MTA.‖ Id. art. 15.1(b)(ii). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In October 1994, the FAO and eleven CGIAR centers which were 
depositaries of ex situ collections had signed agreements placing 
these collections under the auspices of the FAO and instituting an 
International Network of Ex Situ Collections, ―for the benefit of the 
international community, in particular the developing countries.‖32 
With respect to transfers of samples, the centers were to ensure by 
arrangements, such as material transfer agreements, that the 
recipients would not seek intellectual property protection on the 
material and that they would pass on the same obligation to 
subsequent recipients.
33
 However, the source center was under no 
obligation to monitor the compliance of the recipient with these 
undertakings.
34
 
During its second session in November 2007, the Governing Body 
endorsed the proposal put forth by the IARCs to also apply the 
SMTA to non-listed plant genetic resources held by IARCs, without 
making a distinction as to the date of acquisition. This position was 
justified by the fact that Article 15.1(b) of the International Treaty 
required the model MTA to be adopted in accordance with Articles 
12 and 13, i.e., the very articles instituting the multilateral system and 
containing the benefit-sharing provisions. The IARCs would thus be 
relieved of the administrative burden of keeping track of two 
different sets of MTAs.
35
 
In such a case, the date on which soybean or coffee samples 
conserved by an IARC were received would not make any practical 
difference. These samples could either fall under Article 15.1(b) or 
15.3 of the International Treaty; they would still be subject to the 
SMTA, if the Governing Body maintains this solution during its third 
session and extends the application of the SMTA to non-listed 
PGRFAs.  
 
 32. BOOKLET, supra note 21, at 21. 
 33. Id. at 5. 
 34. Id. at 9. 
 35. Food and Agric. Org. of the U.N., Consideration of the Material Transfer Agreement 
to Be Used by International Agricultural Research Centres for Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture Not Included in Annex 1 of the Treaty, ¶ 6, FAO Doc. IT/GB-2/07/13 
Rev.1 (Oct. 29–Nov. 2, 2007); Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., Report of the Governing Body 
of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Second 
Session, ¶ 68, FAO Doc. IT/GB-2/07/Report (Oct. 29–Nov. 2, 2007).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/14
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The example of the Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher 
Education Center (―CATIE‖),36 located in Costa Rica, helps clarify 
the status of coffee germplasm under the International Treaty. 
Ethiopia is the center of origin and diversification of Arabica coffee. 
Accessions
37
 of Ethiopian origin represent roughly 42% of the total 
number of CATIE accessions, amounting to 1,832.
38
 In terms of wild 
coffee bushes, 78% of the 917 types maintained originate from 
Ethiopia.
39
 Overall, 3,000 Ethiopian coffee samples are conserved in 
Costa Rican collections, along with other collections kept in Ethiopia, 
India, Portugal, and Tanzania, which gathered beans collected by the 
United Nations from 1964–1965 in Ethiopian areas being 
deforested.
40
 Ethiopian germplasm is the genetic base of most of 
Coffea arabica grown in Latin America and Asia.  
A model agreement between the Governing Body of the 
International Treaty and the International Agriculture Research 
Centers and other relevant international institutions was approved in 
June 2006 by the Governing Body of the International Treaty 
pursuant to Article 15 of the International Treaty.
41
 It recalls the 
agreement signed on October 26, 1994, placing the collections of the 
CGIAR under the auspices of the FAO.
42
 The new agreement has the 
effect of including the signatory centers in the list of International 
Agricultural Research Centers of the CGIAR and of granting the 
centers facilitated access to PGRFAs listed in Annex I.
43
 On World 
 
 36. See CATIE, http://www.catie.ac.cr/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2009). 
 37. The term ―accessions‖ means varieties contributed to or developed by a collection. 
 38. FRANÇOIS ANTHONY & CARLOS ASTORGA, PROYECTO DE RENOVACIÓN DEL 
GERMOPLASMA DE CAFÉ DEL CATIE 4 fig. 1 (1997). 
 39. Id. 
 40. ETHIOPIA MINISTRY OF AGRIC. & RURAL DEV., AGRIC. MKTG. SECTOR COFFEE—THE 
GIFT OF ETHIOPIA TO THE WORLD 4; see also David Brough & Reese Ewing, Decaf Coffee Find 
Brews into Ownership Spat, GRAIN, July 13, 2004, http://www.grain.org/bio-ipr/?id=404; Mike 
Shanahan, Natural ‗Decaf‘ Coffee Discovered by Brazilian Scientists, SCIDEV.NET, June 24, 
2004, http://www.scidev.net/News/index.cfm?fuseaction=readnews&itemid=1453&language= 
1. 
 41. See Food and Agric. Org. of the U.N., supra note 29, ¶ 32, app. K. 
 42. See Agreement Between [Name of Centre] and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO) Placing Collections of Plant Germplasm Under the Auspices of 
FAO (Oct., 2006), available at http://www.irri.org/GRC/GRChome/FAO-Centre%20agree 
ment.pdf.  
 43. Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., supra note 29, at app. K at 3. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Food Day in October 2006, CATIE signed this agreement.
44
 Hence, 
the coffee samples held by CATIE are now part of the Multilateral 
System. 
Although the weight of coffee has been declining over the past 
decade from 67% of Ethiopia‘s earnings from exports in 200045 to 
37% in 2004,
46
 coffee production still involves over a million farming 
households (70% having land plots of less than 0.5 hectare—half 
hectare) and about 25% of the population of that country.
47
 Owing to 
the new status of CATIE collections and the existence of several ex 
situ collections of Ethiopian coffee germplasm, it seems that this 
germplasm cannot command high prices in bilateral agreements 
based on the Convention on Biological Diversity.  
China appears to be in a slightly better position when it comes to 
trading soybean germplasm. China has recently become a net 
importer of soybean as a commodity. In 2003, China produced 15.4 
million tons of soybeans, tantamount to 9% of world production.
48
 Its 
share of world demand rose to 18% that same year.
49
 China imported 
20.7 million tons of soybeans in 2003 and became the largest 
importer of soybeans in the world.
50
 For half of its soybean use, 
China relies on imports from the United States, Brazil, and 
 
 44. See Food and Agric. Org. of the U.N., Draft Agreements Between the Governing Body 
and the IARCS of the CGIAR and Other Relevant International Institutions, IT/GB-1/06/9 (June 
2006). 
 45. See Tadesse Woldemariam Gole, Conservation and Use of Coffee Genetic Resources 
in Ethiopia: Challenges and Opportunities in the Context Current Global Situations 2 (Global 
Development Network, 2003) http://www.gdnet.org/cms.php?id=research_paper_abstract& 
research_paper_id=4905. 
 46. Food and Agric. Org. of the U.N., FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment 
Mission to Ethiopia, 4 tbl. 2 (Jan. 28, 2005), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/j3958 
e00.htm. 
 47. TORA BÄCKMAN, FAIRTRADE COFFEE AND DEVELOPMENT: A FIELD STUDY IN 
ETHIOPIA 5, 12 (Dep‘t of Econ. at the Univ. of Lund, Minor Field Study Series No. 188, 2009). 
 48. FRANCIS C. TUAN ET AL., CHINA‘S SOYBEAN IMPORTS EXPECTED TO GROW DESPITE 
SHORT-TERM DISRUPTIONS, USDA ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE OUTLOOK REPORT 6 
(USDA Economic Research Service 2004), http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/OCS/Oct04/ 
OCS04J01/OCS04J01/ocs04j01.pdf. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 10. 
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Argentina.
51
 In contrast, the United States produced 35% of the world 
soybean output in 2003 and was the world‘s largest exporter.52 
However, China is the center of origin of the soybean and has 
tried to retain most of its wild lines. China‘s report to the FAO 
International Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources, held 
in Leipzig in 1996, indicates that since 1949, nearly two hundred 
superior varieties of soybean were selected in China.
53
 The provinces 
where wild soybeans can be found are identified in the report as 
Tibet, Anhui, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, and Shandong.
54
 
Additionally, from 1979 to 1995, the Ministry of Agriculture had 
organized more than twenty collection trips to Yunan, to ―collect key 
crops, including wild soybean.‖55 China released 651 cultivars not 
related to each other from 1923 to 1995.
56
  
In contrast, in the United States, only 12 ancestors contributed to 
the genomic ancestry of 88% of the 136 soybean cultivars released 
from 1939 to 1998.
57
 The soybeans grown today in Illinois are 
descended from Chinese varieties that were introduced into the 
United States from 1910 to 1930. A study has shown that few of the 
20,000 landraces available in China by 1900 were used as breeding 
stock in China and North America.
58
 Thus, in 1992, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (―USDA‖) entered into an arrangement 
with the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, and received germplasm 
from four Chinese provinces. In 1996, a second germplasm exchange 
agreement was signed by the USDA and the Chinese Ministry of 
Agriculture, for a budget of $160,000 (in 1996), concerning one 
thousand accessions from eight Chinese provinces.
59
 From 1992 to 
 
 51. Id. at 12. 
 52. Id. at 6. 
 53. CHINA MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, CHINA COUNTRY REPORT TO THE FAO 
INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL CONFERENCE ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 32 (1995), 
available at http://www.fao.org/ag/Agp/AGPS/PGRFA/pdf/china.pdf. 
 54. Id. at 28. 
 55. Id. at 41.  
 56. Zhanglin Cui et al., Genetic Diversity Patterns in Chinese Soybean Cultivars Based on 
Coefficient of Parentage, 40 CROP SCI. 1780, 1780 (2000). 
 57. K.S. Lewers, S.K. St. Martin, B.R. Hedges & R.G. Plamer, Testcross Evaluation of 
Soybean Germplasm, 38 CROP SCI. 1143, 1143 (1998). 
 58. Zhanglin Cui et al., Phenotypic Diversity of Modern Chinese and North American 
Soybean Cultivars Based on Coefficient of Parentage, 40 CROP SCI. 1954, 1954 (2001). 
 59. Soybean Germplasm Exchange with China, STRATSOY, MAR. 28, 1995, http://www. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
476 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 30:465 
 
 
1999, the number of Chinese varieties in the USDA collection 
increased from 2,900 to 6,100, originating from 27 different 
provinces in China.  
A third germplasm exchange with China has been negotiated since 
1999 and still was the object of negotiation as of 2005, according to 
the last available minutes of the U.S. Soybean Crop Germplasm 
Committee Meeting.
60
  
A quote from the 1996–2005 minutes seems pertinent: 
The G. soja collection is small compared to the G. max 
collection. It is still very difficult to obtain any G. soja 
accessions from China and that remains a high priority. No G. 
soja accessions have ever been obtained from North Korea. 
Additional G. soja collecting in South Korea, Russia, and 
Japan would be possible and could benefit the Collection.
61
 
Thus, while pursuing negotiations with the Chinese authorities, the 
USDA conducted a collection trip to Vietnam, mainly in the northern 
highlands bordering China, and gathered some four hundred 
accessions, now grown in Puerto Rico for study. Additionally, the 
USDA took an interest in the Russian collections, reported to be in 
jeopardy, especially in the far eastern part of Russia, and reported to 
include fifteen thousand accessions of Glycine max and Glycine 
soja.
62
 
This example shows that even in situations where most of the wild 
lines of a given crop are kept in the center of origin, interested 
countries might still be able to find germplasm in centers of 
diversification.
63
 More broadly, although a center of diversity,
64
 
 
stratsoy.uiuc.edu/research_96/il049017.html.  
 60. USDA, Soybean CGC Meeting, Soybean Crop Germplasm Committee Report-1996, 
http://www.ars.gov/npgs/cgc_reports/soybeanstatus96.htm (updated Nov. 2005). 
 61. Id. at pt. IV. 
 62. Minutes 1999 Soybean Crop Germplasm Committee Meeting, SOYBEAN GENETICS 
NEWSLETTER, http://www.web.archive.org/web/20041221065512/http://www.soygenetics.org/ 
minutes/1999GermplasmMinutes.htm. Glycine max is the name for cultivated soybean, and 
Glycine soja is the name for wild soybean. It seems that USDA Soybean Collection efforts to 
get new germplasm are currently being refocused on Vietnamese germplasm. See USDA 
Agricultural Research Service Project, Soybean Collecting in Vietnam: Southern and Central 
Areas, http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=405599 (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2009).  
 63. The previous discussion draws on Muriel Lightbourne, Organization and Legal 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/14
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China is dependent on exotic germplasm, like most countries. Use by 
China of soybean elite cultivars from North America as breeding 
stock have been documented.
65
 Further, while China distributed three 
thousand accessions (for all plants) to more than ninety countries in 
1995, they received between three thousand and five thousand 
accessions from abroad.
66
  
A third example is provided by the duplicate set of the seed 
collection of the International Rice Research Institute (―IRRI‖) 
deposited for safekeeping at a USDA gene bank in Fort Collins, 
Colorado.
67
 An agreement was reached in 2004 to extend this 
cooperation between IRRI and the USDA until April 2009.
68
 It 
appears that duplicates of FAO trust material are not necessarily 
placed under the same conditions as the original samples—i.e., a 
material transfer agreement restricting applications for intellectual 
property rights on the material in the form received.
69
 
The other features of the standard material agreement must be 
described, and it might be interesting to do so in comparison with the 
 
Regimes Governing Seed Markets in the People‘s Republic of China, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & 
POL‘Y 229. 
 64. Nikolai Ivanovich Vavilov, a Russian scientist, developed in 1926 the theory that 
crops had both a center of origin in specific regions of the world where their cultivation started, 
and centers of diversity. The latter are areas where variation within a given crop is strongest. 
B.S. Kurlovich et al., The Significance of Vavilov‘s Scientific Expeditions and Ideas for 
Development and Use of Legume Genetic Resources, PGR NEWSLETTER (Biodiversity Int‘l, 
Rome, Italy), Dec. 2000, at 23. 
 65. Cui et al., supra note 58, at 1954. 
 66. CHINA MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 53, at 36.  
 67. See RAFI, The Chickpea Scandal: Trust or Consequences?, SEEDLING, Mar. 1998, 
available at http://www.grain.org/publications/mar983-en.cfm. 
 68. See USDA Agricultural Research Service Project, Cooperation with the International 
Rice Research Institute, http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO= 
408165 (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).  
 69. The USDA ―National Plant Germplasm System distributes germplasm to foreign 
requesters in compliance with federal quarantine regulations and restrictions of the United 
States and the recipient country.‖ USDA Agricultural Research Service, Request Germplasm-
National Plant Germplasm System, http://www.ars-grin.gov/npgs/foreign.html (last visited May 
23, 2008). Whereas the prior informed consent of the country of origin is required, there is no 
mention of intellectual property rights. Foreign requesters and U.S. nationals may place orders 
for ―small quantities for research and education purposes only.‖ USDA Agricultural Research 
Service, Order Germplasm-National Plant Germplasm System, http://www.ars-grin.gov/npgs/ 
order.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2009). 
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latest version of the GNU General Public License,
70
 which constitutes 
one of the open source models.  
II. THE FAO SMTA: FROM COMMONS TO OPEN SOURCE? 
The structure of the draft SMTA laid out in 2005 departed from a 
classic material transfer agreement between private parties only in its 
Preamble. It referred to the International Treaty, to the CBD, to the 
sovereign rights of contracting parties to the International Treaty on 
their plant genetic resources, and to the ―enormous contribution that 
the local and indigenous communities and farmers in all regions of 
the world . . . have made and will continue to make for the 
conservation and development of plant genetic resources.‖71 
Interestingly, Article 2 of the draft circulated in April 2006 added 
in brackets, under the heading ―Parties to the Agreement,‖ that 
―Contracting Parties to the Treaty shall take measures to ensure that 
parties to this Agreement that are under their jurisdiction meet the 
obligations in this Agreement.‖72 This bracketed provision showed 
the particular nature of the SMTA, which will often be an agreement 
between a private party on the one hand and, on the other, a 
multilateral institution, an institution holding the resource at stake on 
behalf of the international community, or a private germplasm 
collection. It was strange, however, to create an obligation for states 
in an agreement between what would be most often private parties. 
Thus, this provision disappeared from the adopted SMTA. Instead, 
the final STMA, adopted by Resolution 2/2006 of the Governing 
Body of the International Treaty during its first meeting, in Madrid in 
June 2006, provides, under Article 4.2 (―General Provisions‖), that 
―[t]he parties recognize that they are subject to the applicable legal 
 
 70. GNU GPL Version 3, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html (last visited Feb. 4, 
2009) [hereinafter GPL]. 
 71. Food and Agric. Org. of the U.N., First Draft of the Standard Material Transfer 
Agreement Prepared by the Secretariat, ¶ 1c, FAO doc. CGRFA/IC/CG-SMTA-1/05/2 (July 
18–22, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 SMTA Draft]. 
 72. See Food and Agric. Org. of the U.N., First Draft Standard Material Transfer 
Agreement, art. 2.3, FAO doc. CCRFA/IC/CG-SMTA-2/06/3 (Apr. 24–28, 2006) [hereinafter 
2006 SMTA Draft]. 
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measures and procedures, that have been adopted by the Contracting 
Parties to the Treaty.‖73 
The SMTA includes several provisions that draw on open source 
models ensuring unencumbered access to software and other 
provisions that are idiosyncratic. The following table contrasts the 
SMTA and the GNU General Public License (―GPL‖) with respect to 
permitted uses, the prohibition of intellectual property rights 
(―IPRs‖), the viral aspects of the license (i.e., conditions for further 
transfer), the prohibition of further restrictions, the possibility to 
charge fees and the status of improvements, the existence of a 
benefit-sharing scheme, and the presence of a disclaimer of warranty 
and liability.  
 
 GNU GPL IT SMTA 
Permitted 
uses 
No restriction Food and agriculture 
research, breeding or 
training (art. 6.1) 
Prohibition 
of IPRs 
No, but non-exclusive, 
royalty-free patent license 
on the contributor‘s version 
after 28 March 2007 (sec. 
11 para. 3, 4 and 7) 
On PGRFAs or their 
genetic parts or 
components in the form 
received (art. 6.2) 
Viral aspect 
(conditions 
for further 
transfers) 
Sec. 5: Modified version 
must carry notice that GPL 
applies, plus any additional 
conditions as per sec.7 
When recipient transfers 
MLS material received, 
must do so under the 
terms of the SMTA (art. 
6.3, 6.4); when he/she 
assigns IPRs on products 
derived thereof, must 
transfer SMTA benefit-
sharing obligations 
(art.6.10) 
No further 
restrictions 
The only possible additional 
conditions can apply only to 
material added by the 
contributor (sec. 7 and 10) 
Except for the transfer of 
material under 
development by the 
provider (art. 5.c), or by 
the recipient (art. 6.6) 
 
 73. Food and Agric. Org. of the U.N., supra note 29, at app. g at 4.2. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
480 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 30:465 
 
 
 GNU GPL IT SMTA 
Possibility to 
charge fees 
Not on ―covered work‖ (i.e. 
unmodified program), not 
on patented derivative 
works (sec. 10 in fine, sec. 
11) if distributed with 
waiver of warranty/liability; 
possible otherwise (sec. 17) 
For material under 
development (art. 6.5, 
6.6); 
Administrative costs (art. 
5(a)) 
Benefit-
sharing 
No Compulsory payment 
where derivative product 
not available without 
restrictions for further 
research and breeding, 
encouraged otherwise 
(art. 6.7, 6.8) 
Disclaimer of 
warranty/ 
liability 
No warranty of 
merchantability and fitness 
for a particular purpose (sec. 
15); no liability for damages 
arising out of the 
use/inability to use the 
program, losses of data . . . 
(sec. 16) 
Assumption of liability if a 
fee is charged (sec. 17) 
As to the safety, 
viability, purity of or title 
to the material; as to the 
accuracy of any passport 
or other data (art. 9.1) 
 
Regarding uses, the SMTA is far more restrictive than the GPL. 
Article 6.1 of the SMTA reproduces the requirement set forth by the 
International Treaty that the material accessed not be used for 
chemical, pharmaceutical, or non-food/feed industrial uses.
74
 In such 
instances, the Convention on Biological Diversity should logically 
apply, at least for germplasm held by collections other than the 
CGIAR centers. As to the latter, during the meeting of the CGIAR 
Genetic Resources Policy Committee (―GRPC‖) held in Rome in 
April 2007, it was decided that for CGIAR materials accessed for 
non-food/feed uses and obtained before 1993, the revised interim 
MTA
75
 would apply. The same would hold for materials obtained 
 
 74. SMTA, supra note 29, art. 6.7. 
 75. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/14
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Better than Bilateralism? 481 
 
 
after 1993, provided those materials were received by the IARCs on 
the condition that they can be distributed for research. The status of 
materials obtained by the IARCs after 2007, i.e., after the 
implementation of the SMTA started, is still under discussion.
76
 
During the twenty-third session of the GRPC, held in March 2008, 
general guidelines addressing centers‘ distribution of materials for 
purposes other than conservation, research, or training for food and 
agriculture were being drafted.
77
 
Similarly, the GPL does not provide for any restriction regarding 
applications for intellectual property rights, except that where a 
software user obtains a patent on improvements he or she made to 
software distributed by the Free Software Foundation, that user shall 
grant non-exclusive, royalty-free patent licenses.
78
 The International 
Treaty and the SMTA prevent germplasm users from claiming 
intellectual property rights in plant genetic resources or their genetic 
parts or components ―in the form received from the Multilateral 
System.‖79 This provision raises a series of questions. Are the plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture concerned all those 
covered by the Multilateral System, or only those accessed from the 
Multilateral System? What is meant by ―genetic parts or 
components,‖ and what does the phrase ―in the form received‖ mean?  
Depending on the choice made by the recipient of germplasm 
accessed from the Multilateral System regarding the modes of 
payment to the MLS, the germplasm concerned may simply belong to 
the same crop as one of those pertaining to the MLS.
80
 In their review 
 
 76. MICHAEL HALEWOOD, SEARCHING FOR A LINE IN THE SAND: ISSUES TO CONSIDER 
CONCERNING FINANCIAL RETURNS FROM RECIPIENTS OF CENTRES‘ PGRFA UNDER 
DEVELOPMENT 36, http://www.cgiar.org/exco/exco13/exco13_grpc_ip_guidelines.pdf. 
 77. See Press Release, ICARDA, Meeting of the Genetic Resources Policy Committee 
(Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://www.icarda.cgiar.org/News/2008/3Apr08/3Apr08_A.htm. 
 78. GPL, supra note 70. 
 79. International Treaty, supra note 10, art. 12.3(d); SMTA, supra note 29, art. 6.2. 
 80. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. See also Annex 3 to the SMTA concerning 
Terms and Conditions of the alternative payments scheme under Article 6.11, which states: 
The discounted rate for payments made under Article 6.11 shall be zero point five 
percent (0.5 %) of the Sales of any Products and of the sales of any other products that 
are Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture belonging to the same crop, as 
set out in Annex 1 to the Treaty, to which the Material referred to in Annex 1 to this 
Agreement belong.  
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of non-monetary benefit-sharing options, distinguished commentators 
observed that, in general, ―[t]he Multilateral System does not link 
benefit-sharing directly to access, or to individual genetic resources 
accessed from the Multilateral System.‖81  
The pivotal Article 12.3(d) of the International Treaty is 
reproduced under Article 6.2 of the SMTA. This was formerly Article 
7.2 in the 2005 draft, under which two footnotes qualified what ―the 
Material provided under this Agreement, or its genetic parts or 
components‖ meant.82 This included ―seeds, organs, tissues, cells, 
genes and DNA that come from the Material provided under this 
Agreement,‖ but not ―a gene . . . separated or refined from the 
Material, or their [sic] genetic parts or components received under 
this Agreement with a view to clarifying its functions.‖83 These 
footnotes were later withdrawn and do not appear in the final text. 
The reference to the patentability of an isolated gene remains highly 
controversial in many jurisdictions.
84
 However, in the United States, 
Japan, and the European Union, an isolated, purified gene is no 
longer supposed to be ―in the form received.‖ 
Concerning the conditions for further transfer of software/ 
material, the GPL imposes fewer restrictions on the user than the 
FAO SMTA. A program distributed by the Free Software Foundation 
 
SMTA, supra note 29, at Annex 3. 
 81. See Bert Visser, Robin Pistorius, Rob van Raalte, Derek Eaton & Niels Louwaars, 
Options for Non-Monetary Benefit-Sharing—An Inventory ¶ 13 (FAO Background Study Paper 
No. 30, 2004). 
 82. 2005 SMTA Draft, supra note 71, art. 6.2, nn.2–3. 
 83. Id. at nn.2–3.  
 84. The United States introduced a new text on access to plant genetic resources during 
the June 2001 session, allowing intellectual property rights on ―genetic parts and components 
that have been modified or isolated‖ from material received from the multilateral system. 
UKabc Report on the 6th Extraordinary Session of the FAO CGRFA, June 25–30, 2001, 
http://www.ukabc.org/cgrfa6ex.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2009). Much of this text found its 
way in the final version of the International Treaty, although ―that have been modified or 
isolated‖ was replaced with the phrase ―in the form received from the Multilateral System‖ in a 
new negative sentence, prohibiting intellectual property protection. International Treaty, supra 
note 10, art. 12.3(d). As recalled by Helfer, the United States and Japan wanted the first phrase 
(―genetic parts or components‖) deleted and the second (―in the form received‖) maintained in 
this new sentence, whereas developing countries defended the opposite position. See Laurence 
R. Helfer, Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Varieties: An Overview with Options for 
National Governments, in FAO LEGAL PAPERS ONLINE, No. 31, 51 (July 2002), http://www. 
fao.org/Legal/Prs-OL/lpo31.pdf. 
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may be modified by a user, and the modified version may be 
distributed under a different license, provided that such license 
carries notice that the GPL applies.
85
 However, pursuant to Section 
10, this new license shall not include additional conditions other than 
those listed under Section 7 of the GPL, and these conditions can 
apply only to material added by the contributor.
86
 This list of 
additional conditions constitutes an innovation of the new version of 
the GPL, which goes much further in terms of precision than Section 
10 of the previous one. 
Under the SMTA, a recipient who obtains intellectual property 
rights on any products developed from the material or its components 
and assigns such rights to a third party shall transfer the benefit-
sharing obligations of this agreement to that third party.
87
  
Irrespective of the existence of intellectual property rights, when 
the recipient transfers the material supplied under the SMTA to 
another person or entity, he or she shall ―do so under the terms and 
conditions of the [SMTA], through a new material transfer 
agreement;‖ and notify the Governing Body.88 Provided these 
requirements are fulfilled, the recipient who transfers the material 
supplied shall be relieved of any further obligations concerning the 
actions of the subsequent recipient.
89
 This provision was already 
present in the 2006 draft, in brackets.
90
 The last sentence would have 
been a dangerous one in the absence of the double condition, which 
allows the Governing Body to track uses made of accessed material. 
Article 7.8 of the 2006 draft subjected any subsequent transfer of the 
material (by the second recipient) to the rights of the country of 
origin of the PGRFA at stake.
91
 Such a provision could have had the 
 
 85. GPL, supra note 70, art. 5(b). 
 86. Id. art. 7, 10. 
 87. SMTA, supra note 29, art. 6.10. 
 88. Id. art. 6.4. 
 89. Id. 
 90. 2006 SMTA Draft, supra note 72, art. 7.7. In 2006, Carlos Correa warned that ―unless 
it is understood that the SMTA must be signed by any subsequent recipient of products that 
incorporate the received PGRFA, the chain of payments (except if voluntarily made) would be 
interrupted when the first incorporation of the material into a product takes place.‖ Carlos M. 
Correa, Considerations on the Standard Material Transfer Agreement Under the FAO Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 137, 144 
(2006). 
 91. 2006 SMTA Draft, supra note 72, art. 7.8. 
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effect of blocking further transfer of PGRFAs at some stage, when 
the country of origin happened to have implemented restrictive 
legislation on access and benefit-sharing. This would have run 
counter to the overarching goal of the International Treaty. It was not 
retained in the final SMTA. 
Unlike the GPL, the SMTA prohibits the introduction of 
additional conditions, except where the transfer concerns material 
under development by the provider (Article 5(c)) or by the recipient 
(Article 6.5). In the first case, access to the material shall be at the 
discretion of the developer.
92
 In the second situation, the recipient 
shall transfer PGRFAs that are still under development under the 
terms and conditions of the SMTA through a new MTA, without 
Article 5(a) applying.
93
 Thus, this recipient might be entitled to 
charge a fee over the minimal cost when transferring the derivative 
material. This is confirmed by Article 6.6, which states that for such 
material, parties may attach additional conditions to the MTA, 
including monetary consideration.
94
 
The GPL and the SMTA converge where compliance enforcement 
is concerned: both documents consider that the user who redistributes 
the software or material shall not be responsible for enforcing 
compliance by third parties.
95
 
Regarding the status of improvements, the GPL and the SMTA 
present some discrepancies. The GPL prevents a user from charging 
fees for the distribution of an unmodified program.
96
 However, 
charging fees is allowed for patented derivative works provided these 
works are distributed with a warranty or an assumption of liability by 
the user/distributor.
97
 Conversely, the SMTA always provides for 
both a disclaimer of warranty and liability and the possibility to 
charge fees, which shall not exceed the administrative costs 
involved.
98
 As already seen, there are two exceptions to this rule: 
where the material transferred is being developed by the recipient (of 
 
 92. SMTA, supra note 29, art. 5(c). 
 93. Id. art. 6.5. 
 94. Id. art. 6.6. 
 95. Id. art. 6.4; GPL, supra note 70, art. 10. 
 96. GPL, supra note 70, art. 2. 
 97. Id. art. 17. 
 98. SMTA, supra note 29, art. 5(a). 
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MLS material, transformed),
99
 and where the material transferred is 
being developed by the provider.
100
 According to the definition 
included in the Standard Material Transfer Agreement, ―plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture under development‖ means 
material derived from material accessed from the Multilateral 
System, ―and hence distinct from it, that is not yet ready for 
commercialization.‖101 
The status of material under development is currently the object of 
debates within the CGIAR network. In the past years, three 
significant documents were adopted in relation to material developed 
by CGIAR centers and intellectual property rights. In August 2004 
the ―Agreement to Establish a Consortium for the Generation 
Challenge Program: Cultivating Plant Diversity for the Resource-
Poor‖ was aimed at improving food security and livelihoods in 
developing countries ―by unlocking the genetic potential of crop 
species and their relatives and enhancing the use of public genetic 
resources in plant breeding programs through the concerted 
generation, management, dissemination, and application of 
comparative biological knowledge.‖102 It states that consortium 
members who develop a given material will retain intellectual 
property rights on that material. These intellectual property rights are 
not meant to be purely defensive,
103
 as Article 26 of the agreement 
 
 99. Id. art. 6.6. 
 100. Id. art. 5(c). 
 101. Id. art. 2. In 2005, GRPC of the CGIAR had endorsed the policy followed hitherto by 
the centers consisting in treating advanced or elite lines still under development by them as 
material covered by the SMTA. See SUMMARY REPORT OF THE GENETIC RESOURCES POLICY 
COMMITTEE (GRPC) MEETINGS HELD IN 2005 app. I ¶ 8, available at http://www.cgiar.org. 
pdf/agm05/agm05_grpc_report.pdf. According to Shakeel Bhatti, Executive Secretary of the 
International Treaty, the GRPC confirmed in its April 2008 meeting that the notion of ―material 
under development‖ had to be interpreted in a restrictive way. Shakeel Bhatti, Executive 
Secretary of the International Treaty, Presentation at the World Intellectual Property 
Organization Symposium on Public Policy Patent Landscaping in the Life Sciences (Apr. 6, 
2008). 
 102. AGROPOLIS ET AL., AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH A CONSORTIUM FOR THE GENERATION 
CHALLENGE PROGRAM: CULTIVATING PLANT DIVERSITY FOR THE RESOURCE-POOR, Recital B, 
art. 3 (2004), available at http://www.generationcp.org/sccv10/sccv10_upload/Consortium_ 
agreement.pdf. 
 103. A defensive approach to patents consists in applying for a patent but not working or 
assigning it in order to prevent others from applying and enforcing a patent on a similar 
invention. 
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specifically authorizes the consortium to ―pursue opportunities to 
[c]ommerciali[z]e IP.‖104 It was subsequently amended in 2005 in 
order to waive intellectual property rights for the benefit of 
―Subsistence Users,‖ defined as users or consumers of the program 
―a) for direct personal or family consumption; or b) for barter 
(exchange) for personal or family food, shelter, fuel or clothing; or c) 
in trade for business resulting in monetary income of less than 
€10,000 per year per business entity.‖105 Two additional documents 
were adopted that same year, namely the Alliance of Future Harvest 
Centers of the CGIAR Guidelines for Center Modes of Collaboration 
with the Private Sector, and the Guidelines for Collaboration 
Agreements between CGIAR Centers and Private Companies within 
the context of the Scientific and Know-How Exchange Program 
(―SKEP‖). One option considered in the latter guidelines regarding 
joint results resides in granting the private partner the right to apply 
for, maintain, and abandon registrable intellectual property rights in 
CGIAR countries or for CGIAR crops in the private company‘s name 
but at the expense of the CGIAR Center.
106
 While having a bearing 
on the financial resources of the CGIAR Centers, such an option 
would not allow them to remain in control, even in a defensive 
perspective, of their potential intellectual property policies. 
As highlighted by Halewood, the SKEP guidelines do not 
specifically mention what use should be made of the royalties 
received. Halewood further notes that ―Centres have not responded to 
SKEP with great enthusiasm.‖107 Some centers have argued that 
accepting financial compensation for plant genetic resources under 
 
 104. AGROPOLIS ET AL., supra note 102, art. 26; see also HALEWOOD, supra note 76, at 7.  
 105. Generation Challenge Program, Amendments to the GCP Consortium Agreement to 
Include Agreement Not to Assert Rights for Subsistence Use (Nov. 25, 2005), http://www. 
generationcp.org/comm/manual/doc_127.pdf; see also HALEWOOD, supra note 76, at 7 n.19. 
That provision is reminiscent of the GoldenRice™ humanitarian license. Syngenta has made 
GoldenRice™ freely available only to farmers earning less than $10,000 from it per year, 
provided the rice they produce is not exported. GRAIN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
ULTIMATE CONTROL OF AGRICULTURAL R&D IN ASIA 13 (2001); see also Goldenrice.org, 
Intellectual Property-Related Issues, http://www.goldenrice.org/Content2-How/how9_IP.html 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2009). However, unlike the GoldenRice Project, the GCP Consortium 
Agreement does not limit the definition of ―Subsistence Users‖ to users in developing countries. 
Generation Challenge Program, supra. 
 106. See HALEWOOD, supra note 76, at 9. 
 107. Id. at 13. 
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development could have the effect of diverting the centers‘ research 
efforts from stakeholders unable to pay, impairing the relations with 
non-governmental organizations and discouraging donors from 
maintaining their support.
108
 Nevertheless, several authors have 
observed that exclusive licensing by CGIAR Centers may become 
common practice.
109
 The research on apomixis conducted by the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (known by its 
Spanish acronym CIMMYT), one of the CGIAR Future Harvest 
Centers, provides an example of this gradual shift. The term of 
―apomixis‖ designates the clonal propagation of plants, for instance 
by taking a sprout, leaf, or part of the stem cuttings (vegetative 
reproduction), or plant asexual reproduction involving seeds in which 
sexual fusion has not occurred. Apomixis is used in breeding 
programs to elaborate hybrids, derived from sexually reproducing 
plants, that would be able to reproduce clonally while retaining their 
vigor. Thus, there would be no need for the breeder to maintain 
parental pure lines, as in the case of normal hybrids. There also 
would be no need for the farmer to buy new seeds for every 
reproduction cycle. Moreover, mechanical harvesting is facilitated. In 
tubers, the advantage over tuber propagation lies in the reduction of 
virus propagation. It is assumed that genes controlling apomixis can 
be found in the wild species of the genus or related genera of most 
major cultivated crops. Since 1990, a joint research project between 
CIMMYT and France‘s Institut de Recherche pour le Développement 
(―IRD,‖ ex-ORSTOM) has been focusing on how to transfer this trait 
to maize. In 1999, CIMMYT and IRD concluded a five-year research 
collaboration agreement with Pioneer Hi-Bred, Limagrain, and 
Syngenta with the same object.
110
 Under the terms of this agreement, 
CIMMYT is limited to developing research products only for 
 
 108. See id. at 15. 
 109. See DAVID J. SPIELMAN, FRANK HARTWICH & KLAUS VON GREBMER, SHARING 
SCIENCE, BUILDING BRIDGES, AND ENHANCING IMPACT: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN 
THE CGIAR 41–42 (2007); E. Binnenbaum, The Intellectual Property Strategy of International 
Agricultural Research Centres, 12 AGRIBUSINESS REVIEW (2004), http://www.agrifood.info/ 
review/2004/Binenbaum.html; see also HALEWOOD, supra note 76, at 13–14. 
 110. See Timothy G. Reeves & Kelly A. Cassaday, Global Public Goods for Poor 
Farmers: Myth or Reality?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WARREN E. KRONSTAD SYMPOSIUM 1, 11 
(J. Reeves, A. McNab & S. Rajaram eds., 2001). 
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―subsistence farmers,‖ i.e., farmers using over 50% of their harvest 
on the farm.
111
 CIMMYT is reportedly a co-assignee on a Patent 
Cooperation Treaty filed in 1998 and two Australian patent 
applications related to apomixis filed in 2002 and 2005, 
respectively.
112
 
The provision that departs the most from an open source model is 
the benefit-sharing one. Pursuant to Article 13.3 of the International 
Treaty, benefits arising from the use of plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture that are shared under the Multilateral System 
should flow primarily, directly and indirectly, to farmers in all 
countries, especially in developing countries.
113
 However, tracking 
the respective contributions of farmers, even at a collective level—
such as assessing the role of farmers in a given country or region—let 
alone at an individual one, is impossible. As underlined in a report by 
several distinguished authors, the ―geographical origins of the myriad 
distinctive properties found in PGRFA are largely shrouded in 
millennia of evolutionary history.‖114 Thus, it can be argued, in 
reference to FAO Resolution 5/89 and following Stephen Brush, that 
the Multilateral System will not aim so much at rewarding past 
contributions, but rather at encouraging future ones and conservation 
of plant genetic resources by local communities.
115
  
As already mentioned, Article 13.2(d)(ii) of the International 
Treaty provides:  
[T]he standard Material Transfer Agreement referred to in 
Article 12.4 shall include a requirement that a recipient who 
 
 111. See GRAIN, supra note 105, at 13. 
 112. See CGIAR SCI. COUNCIL, CGIAR RESEARCH STRATEGIES FOR IPG IN A CONTEXT OF 
IPR—REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THREE STUDIES 23 (2006), available at 
http://www.sciencecouncil.cgiar.org/fileadmin/user_upload/sciencecouncil/Reports/IPR_Report
_Web.pdf (quoting other cases of patent applications filed by other CGIAR Centres). A search 
on www.patentlens.net returned the patent applications: WO 1998/036090, AU 2002/027669, 
and AU 2005/200063, on June 26, 2008. 
 113. International Treaty, supra note 10, art. 13.3. 
 114. MICHEL PETIT, CARY FOWLER, WANDA COLLINS, CARLOS CORREA & CARL-GUSTAF 
THORNSTRÖM, WHY GOVERNMENTS CAN‘T MAKE POLICY: THE CASE OF PLANT GENETIC 
RESOURCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 9 (2001). 
 115. See Stephen B. Brush, The Demise of ‗Common Heritage‘ and Protection for 
Traditional Agricultural Knowledge, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 297 (Charles McManis ed., 
2007). 
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commercializes a product that is a plant genetic resource for 
food and agriculture and that incorporates material accessed 
from the Multilateral System, shall pay to the mechanism . . . 
an equitable share of the benefits arising from the 
commercialization of that product, except whenever such a 
product is available without restriction to others for further 
research and breeding . . . .
116
 
This provision includes several problematic terms that had to be 
defined in the SMTA. The provision of the SMTA (initially Article 3 
of the draft) setting out the definitions was one of the most 
controversial, particularly as far as the words ―commercializes,‖ 
―product,‖ and ―incorporates‖ were concerned. Among the proposals 
in brackets for the definition of ―commercializes,‖ the 2005 draft 
listed the acts of making a request for a plant genetic resource for 
food and agriculture with a view to commercializing a product and of 
offering for sale a product, which were subsequently dropped, as 
these were obviously too upstream to actually generate commercial 
benefits.
117
 The only option retained in the April 2006 draft read as 
follows: ―to sell, lease, or license a Product or Products for monetary 
consideration.‖118 The definition finally adopted in June 2006 reads 
as follows: ―‗To commercialize‘ means to sell a Product or Products 
for monetary consideration on the open market . . . . 
Commercialization shall not include any form of transfer of Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture under Development.‖119  
In turn, among the suggestions for the definition of ―Product,‖ the 
exclusion of ―grain‖ was already present in the 2005 draft, and was 
retained in the 2006 draft.
120
 One of the possible definitions in the 
April 2006 draft was  
[a plant genetic resource for food and agriculture [developed 
by the recipient][and derived from the Material . . . through 
research and breeding] that incorporates [by pedigree, at least 
 
 116. See International Treaty, supra note 10, art. 13.2(ii). 
 117. 2005 SMTA Draft, supra note 71, art. 3.1. 
 118. 2006 SMTA Draft, supra note 72, art. 3.1. 
 119. SMTA, supra note 29, art. 2. The status of material under development by IARCs is 
still being discussed. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 120. 2005 SMTA Draft, supra note 71, art. 3.1; 2006 SMTA Draft, supra note 72, art. 3.1. 
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twenty-five percent (25%) of the Material or that contains an 
identifiable trait of value or essential characteristic of the 
Material][Material accessed from the Multilateral System and 
that has undergone [innovation][development] and is to be 
commercialized.]]
121
 
The notion of pedigree associated with a threshold would require 
resorting to fingerprinting and could prove cumbersome, especially 
as the International Treaty states that the material placed under the 
MLS shall be accessible ―expeditiously, without the need to track 
individual accessions.‖122 Such tracking would nevertheless have 
been useful.
123
 However, it should still be possible (although 
cumbersome) to determine afterwards the genetic make-up of the 
material contributed to the MLS in its original form for a comparison 
with the modified result after development. The condition that a trait 
of value or essential characteristic be identifiable would have limited 
the scope of Article 13.2(d)(ii).
124
 
During the first session of the ITPGR Governing Body, in June 
2006, the attention of delegates was drawn to the adoption of a 
workable draft of the SMTA. In this context, the definition of the 
term ―product‖ gave rise to an intense debate.125 Delegates agreed to 
exclude ―commodities and other products used for food, feed, and 
 
 121. 2006 SMTA Draft, supra note 72, art. 3.1 (structure and brackets in original). 
 122. See International Treaty, supra note 10, art. 12.3(b). 
 123. In any case, the database for the germplasm distributed by IRRI under the SMTA is 
particularly comprehensive as pertains to each IRRI SMTA, with information including its date, 
the recipient‘s name and country, the number of samples, their accession numbers, species, 
designations, date of acquisition, country of origin, pedigree, and status under the IT and 
storage location (including, where applicable, duplicate sites). See IRRI‘s Portal for the Online 
Dissemination of Information on Rice Exported from IRRI Under the Standard Material 
Transfer Agreement of the Multilateral System of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture, http://www.iris.irri.org/smta (last visited Jan. 19, 2009). 
 124. See International Treaty, supra note 10, art. 13.2(d)(ii). Indeed, whereas it may be 
preferable from an agricultural efficiency perspective to require that a Value in Cultivation and 
Use be shown when applying for the registration of a variety on a national catalogue, such a 
requirement as a condition for the application of the MLS benefit-sharing provision would not 
be in favor of farmers.  
 125. See Summary of the First Session of the Governing Body of the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: 12–16 June 2006, June 19, 2006, at 1, 2, 
available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb09369e.pdf/. 
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processing.‖126 The definition eventually adopted under Article 2 of 
the SMTA in June 2006 reads as follows: 
Product means Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture that incorporate the Material or any of its genetic 
parts or components that are ready for commercialization, 
excluding commodities and other products used for food, feed 
and processing.
127
 
In the April 2006 draft, the bracketed definition for ―to 
incorporate‖ referred to ―the incorporation of any, alternatively, part 
of genetic material,‖ ―a genotype from materials,‖ or ―genes or 
functional units of heredity of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture,‖ which are ―accessed from the [MLS] in a Product, 
without taking into account the expression of a trait,‖ or ―that results 
in a functional trait of interest to be maintained.‖128 The option that 
did not require the expression of a specific trait was the most 
favorable to farmers, insofar as whatever transformation the material 
accessed underwent, the presence of the latter in the commercialized 
product would give rise to benefit-sharing. It might have proved too 
controversial an issue, as no definition was adopted in the final 
SMTA. 
The 2006 draft added the definition of ―available without 
restriction,‖ which could be found under Article 7.16 (Rights and 
Obligations of the Recipient) in the 2005 draft.
129
 Just as the legal 
status (whether public or private) of the institution commercializing 
the product was declared irrelevant by the Expert Group, the 2006 
draft stated that ―[a]vailability is not dependent upon any specific 
type of intellectual property right claimed for the Product, but on how 
the owner of the [product] chooses to make the Product available.‖130 
The SMTA provides the following definition (already contained, 
together with other options, in the April 2006 draft) of ―available 
 
 126. This is reminiscent of the solution adopted in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027, available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf. 
 127. SMTA, supra note 29, art. 2. 
 128. 2006 SMTA Draft, supra note 72, art. 3. 
 129. Id.; 2005 SMTA Draft, supra note 71, art. 7.16.  
 130. 2006 SMTA Draft, supra note 72, art. 3. 
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without restriction‖: a product that is ―available for research and 
breeding without any legal or contractual obligations, or 
technological restrictions, that would preclude using it in the manner 
specified in the Treaty.‖131  
The subject matter of the SMTA (Article 3) consists not only of 
the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture described in an 
appendix to the SMTA, but also of the related information.
132
 This 
last reference was in brackets in April 2006,
133
 although, pursuant to 
International Treaty Article 12.3(c), it should not have been the case 
(and indeed, was not in the previous draft), as all available passport 
data shall be made available with the PGRF provided.
134
 
Accordingly, the brackets were removed in the final SMTA. 
Thus, databases compiling information on germplasm and whose 
access is restricted, patents on plants covered by the multilateral 
system, or techniques such as GURTs
135
 are likely to give rise to 
compulsory contributions to the MLS. However, it was observed that 
applications for IPRs should not in themselves trigger benefit-
sharing. Accordingly, the International Treaty benefit-sharing 
requirement applies where the product derived from material received 
from the multilateral system is commercialized with restrictions and 
not available for further research or breeding.
136
 Thus, the Expert 
Group also insisted that there was no reason to exempt public 
institutions commercializing products when the latter are not 
available without restrictions for further research and breeding. 
 
 131. SMTA, supra note 29, art. 2. 
 132. Id. art. 3. 
 133. 2006 SMTA Draft, supra note 72, art. 4. 
 134. International Treaty, supra note 10, art. 12.3(c). 
 135. The so-called Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (―GURTs‖) can be split into two 
categories: V-GURTs, which are ―restriction technologies at the variety level where the seed 
produced from the crop is sterile,‖ and T-GURTs, which consist of ―restriction technologies at 
the trait level where the seed produced from the crop is fertile and only expression of a high 
added-value trait requires a special treatment.‖ INTERNATIONAL SEED FOUNDATION, GENETIC 
USE RESTRICTION TECHNOLOGIES 1 (2003), http://www.worldseed.org/cms/medias/file/ 
PositionPapers/OnSustainableAgriculture/Genetic_Use_Restriction_Technologies_20030611_(
En).pdf. Decision V/5, Section III of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity ‗[r]ecommends that . . . in accordance with the precautionary approach, 
products incorporating such technologies should not be approved by Parties for field testing 
until appropriate scientific data can justify such testing.‖ Convention on Biological Diversity, 
COP 5 Decision V/5, http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=7147 (last visited May 5, 2009). 
 136. International Treaty, supra note 10, at 13.2(d)(ii). 
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Hence, a case-by-case analysis will be necessary when material 
covered by the MLS is commercialized. However, some features of 
patent law and plant breeders‘ rights should be recalled here. 
III. IMPACT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A. Availability of Material Protected by Plant Breeders‘ Rights 
The Expert Group on the Terms of the SMTA, gathered in 
Brussels in October 2004, identified a series of questions that deserve 
attention, even though some of them were not addressed later in the 
course of the drafting of the SMTA. 
The issue relating to the monitoring of PGRFA flows giving rise 
to payment to the MLS was addressed in light of the reserved right of 
the breeder to offer the protected variety for sale.
137
 The solution 
proposed by the Expert Group consisted in checking commercial 
variety catalogues. In most cases, a commercial variety either is 
protected by a patent and in many instances not available for further 
 
 137. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (―TRIPS‖) 
defines minimum rights and incorporates the main provisions of the two main international 
conventions on industrial property and literary and artistic works, namely the Paris Convention 
and the Berne Convention. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS]. The 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, known under its French acronym 
―UPOV,‖ was specifically designed in the early sixties for the protection of plant varieties and 
thereafter modified several times. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants, International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 
33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 109 (as amended in 1978 & 1991), available at http://www.upov. 
int/en/publications/conventions/ [hereinafter UPOV Convention]. The 1991 Act of the UPOV 
Convention protects any plant variety, defined as a plant grouping within a single botanical 
taxon of the lowest known rank, i.e., lower than the rank of genus and of species. To be eligible 
for protection, varieties must satisfy the following criteria (the so-called ―DUS‖ test): 
 Novelty (―at the date of filing of the application . . . , propagating or harvested 
material of the variety has not been sold or otherwise disposed of to others, by or 
with the consent of the breeder‖). UPOV, supra, art. 6. 
 Distinctness (the variety must bear a characteristic which has no equivalent in 
other varieties). Id. art. 7. 
 Uniformity (a broad proportion of the seedlings of a sowing must be identical). Id. 
art. 8. 
 Stability (the relevant characteristics must ―remain unchanged after repeated 
propagation‖). Id. art. 9. 
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research and breeding (unless the applicable patent law provides for 
research exemptions), making the contribution to the MLS 
compulsory, or is not protected at all or protected by plant breeders‘ 
rights, and thus available to others for such purposes, at least 
theoretically. The contribution to the MLS is then, in these two latter 
hypotheses, voluntary so far, and the cost of monitoring would most 
likely be a deterrent. It is worth discussing the breeders‘ exemption 
further, in particular in the light of Advanta USA, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred International, Inc.
138
 The UPOV Convention does not make 
compulsory the deposit of protected material. In the United States, as 
made clear by the Advanta court,
139
 7 U.S.C. § 2422(4) requires the 
applicant to deposit and replenish periodically in a public depository 
the propagating material of the protected variety.
140
 However,  
[w]hile the application is being processed and continuing 
through the term of protection (20-25 years), only the PVPO 
has access to the seed sample. . . . If the application is 
ineligible or denied, or if it is abandoned or withdrawn by the 
applicant, then the seed sample is destroyed or returned to the 
applicant and again is not available to others.
141
  
As further explained by the Advanta court, it is only upon expiration 
of the PVP certificate that the seed sample is transferred to the 
National Seed Storage Laboratory general collection and becomes 
available to others upon request.
142
 Moreover, the research exemption 
does not grant access to protected material. It merely means that if a 
breeder gets access—through products on the market—to seeds and 
uses such seeds for research or to breed a new variety, he or she will 
 
 138. Advanta USA, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int‘l, Inc., No. 04-C-238-S (W.D. Wis. Oct. 
27, 2004), available at http://pub.bna.com/ptcj/04238Oct27.pdf (order granting partial 
summary judgment for plaintiff and partial summary judgment for defendant). 
 139. Id. 
 140. 7 U.S.C. § 2422(4) (2006). 
 141. Advanta, No. 04-C-238-S at 17–18 (relying upon the website of the United States 
Plant Variety Protection Office (―PVPO‖)). The case was ultimately settled during trial just 
before closing arguments. See Bartlit Beck Herman Plenchar & Scott, Profile of Lindley 
Brenza, http://www.bartlit-beck.com/lawyers/bio.asp?whichid=B057110013&type=f (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2009).  
 142. Advanta, No. 04-C-238-S at 18. 
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be exempt from infringement charges.
143
 This was also the position 
expressed by the International Seed Federation (―ISF‖).144 
The previous general assumption regarding the availability of 
plant material protected by breeders‘ rights was indeed partly 
rebutted by the Expert Group in 2004 on a different ground.
145
 
Effectively, pursuant to Article 16(1)(ii) of the 1991 Act of the 
UPOV Convention (and, in Europe, Article 16 of EC Regulation 
2100/94), the breeder can oppose acts of re-export of his protected 
plant material into a country that does not offer protection for the 
genus or species of the plant concerned, unless the exported material 
is for final consumption purposes.
146
 Thus, if the breeder intends to 
avail himself of this right, logically he or she should then make a 
compulsory contribution to the MLS. The difficulty here lies in 
monitoring such instances; the MLS could be informed either by the 
breeder, the customs authorities of the country into which the seeds 
are tentatively re-exported, or by the importer charged royalties by 
the breeder.  
Apart from re-export situations, the notion of essentially derived 
variety might also be a hindrance to the free flow of material 
protected by breeders‘ rights. 
B. The Notion of Essentially Derived Variety 
The notion of ―essential derivation‖ of the 1991 Act of the UPOV 
Convention has to be assessed. Effectively, pursuant to Article 14(5), 
a variety essentially derived from a protected variety will be deemed 
as falling within the scope of the breeders‘ rights over that latter 
variety.
147
  
 
 143. Id. 
 144. INTERNATIONAL SEED FOUNDATION, ISF VIEW ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 8 
(2003), http://www.worldseed.org/cms/medias/file/PositionPapers/OnIntellectualProperty/ISF_ 
View_on_Intellectual_Property_20030611_(En).pdf.  
 145. First Meeting of the Expert Group on the Terms of the Standard Material Transfer 
Agreement, Brussels, Belg., Oct. 4–8, 2004, Report on the Outcome of the Expert Group on the 
Terms of the Standard Material Transfer Agreement, ¶ 23, FAO Doc CGRFA/IC/MTA-1/04/ 
Rep.  
 146. UPOV, supra note 137, art. 16(1)(ii); Council Regulation 2100/94, art. 16, 1994 O.J. 
(L 227) 1 (EC). 
 147. UPOV, supra note 137, art. 14(5). This new notion, introduced by the 1991 Act of the 
UPOV Convention, refers to varieties which are derived from the initial variety and which are 
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Whereas the legal meaning of the notion of essentially derived 
variety (―EDV‖) is disputed, it seems that many experts attach a 
scientific meaning to it, which can be expressed as an attempt to 
prevent ―cosmetic breeding.‖148 An essentially derived variety is a 
variety that, although distinct in the sense of the UPOV Convention, 
retains the essential characteristics resulting from the genotype or 
combination of genotypes of the initial variety and was obtained 
through acts of derivation of the initial, protected variety. It is 
technically possible to have a ―cascade‖ of derivation. Nevertheless, 
each essentially derived variety shall only depend on the initial 
one.
149
 Thus, there is no legal ―cascading‖ of essential derivation. 
As breeding methods vary from species to species, or sometimes 
even within species, so do the thresholds being required to 
characterize essential derivation. Accordingly, the ISF has carried out 
studies on tomato, rye grass, maize, lettuce, and oilseed rape.
150
 An 
additional difficulty lies in the techniques used to establish these 
 
clearly distinguishable from the initial variety while retaining the expression of the essential 
characteristics that result from the genotype or combination of genotypes of the initial variety. 
The International Association of Plant Breeders, which merged in May 2002 with the 
International Seed Trade Federation into the International Seed Federation, had discussed issues 
regarding ―converted lines,‖ distinctness, and novelty since its 1981 Acapulco Congress and 
pressed UPOV ―to again study the question of important characteristics.‖ INT‘L SEED FED‘N, 
ESSENTIAL DERIVATION INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TO BREEDERS 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.amseed.com/pdfs/EDVInfoToBreeders_0605.pdf. However, the Administrative and 
Legal Committee of UPOV considered during its meeting of April 28, 1983, that ―amendment 
to the Convention was inadvisable for the time being.‖ Id. As further explained by the 
International Seed Federation, ―[d]ue to further developments of genetic engineering, decision 
was taken in 1987 to revise the Convention‖ and introduce the concepts of essential derivation 
and dependence. Id.  
 148. Article 14(5)(c) of the 1991 Act of the UPOV provides examples of what constitutes 
an essentially derived variety from a scientific viewpoint: ―Essentially derived varieties may be 
obtained for example by the selection of a natural or induced mutant, or of a somaclonal 
variant, the selection of a variant individual from plants of the initial variety, backcrossing, or 
transformation by genetic engineering.‖ UPOV, supra note 137, art. 14(5)(c). 
 149. INT‘L SEED FED‘N, supra note 147, at 4. 
 150. See id. at 5–7. The International Seed Federation has also published guidelines 
regarding these plants. See Int‘l Seed Fed‘n, Essential Derivation, http://www.worldseed.org/ 
en-us/international_seed/edv.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Guidelines]. The ISF 
establishes a distinction between three zones: the zone of non-derivation, the zone of 
uncertainty (between thresholds 1 and 2), and the zone of indisputable derivation. INT‘L SEED 
FED‘N, supra note 147, at 5–7. Language in all the guidelines provides that the thresholds shall 
be revised after a period of five years ―in the light of the experience gained and the technical 
and scientific evolution.‖ Guidelines, supra.  
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thresholds. The ISF has mainly determined the published 
thresholds—which are not legally binding on jurisdictions—on the 
basis of distances measured by molecular markers. Depending on the 
method used, the results may vary to some extent, as the case of 
maize shows.
151
 Moreover, it has been suggested that measuring 
essential derivation as x% of genetic similarity to the original 
variety
152
 does not give any indication about the derivation process, 
and legally it could lead to situations where a whole gene pool would 
be monopolized. 
More generally, as noted by the ISF, DNA marker profiles are not 
yet predictive of most phenotypic characteristics, as several genes 
might be involved in the expression of a given phenotypic trait. The 
ISF observes that if ―DNA markers were to be used for distinctness, 
then the level of uniformity could not reflect existing levels of 
variability in varieties which have satisfied current DUS 
standards.‖153 The ISF concludes that this would decrease the 
minimum distance between two varieties, narrowing the scope of 
breeders‘ rights and reducing genetic diversity. Thus, ISF insists on 
the use of different tools to assess distinctness on the one hand, which 
should still be based on phenotypic characteristics and not be 
concerned with breeding methods,
154
 and essential derivation on the 
other hand, whose assessment could be based on variety origin, 
 
 151. In an initial analysis done using the Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism 
technique (―RFLP‖), the adopted thresholds were: red zone = above 90% of similarity, orange 
zone = between 90% and 85%, green zone = below 85%. INT‘L SEED FED‘N, supra note 147, at 
5. A subsequent analysis using microsatellites reached a new threshold of 82% demarcating the 
orange and green zones. Id. 
 152. As was the case under the provisional MTA adopted by the International Centre for 
Tropical Agriculture, a CGIAR Future Harvest Center, before the entry into force of the 
International Treaty. Article 2 of that MTA was concerned with the  
material . . . obtained through effective and substantial backcrossing or [that] has ¼ or 
more of its lineage different from germplasm accessions, the access of which is 
regulated either through the Food and Organization of the United Nations (FAO)-
CGIAR agreement on in-trust collections signed on 26 October 1994, or by the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity.  
CIAT Material Transfer Agreement for Breeding and Bred Materials, art. 2, (2001), available at 
http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/improved_germplasm/mta_breeding.htm. 
 153. INT‘L SEED FED‘N, ISF VIEW ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4 (2003), available at 
http://www.worldseed.org/cms/medias/file/PositionPapers/OnIntellectualProperty/ISF_View_ 
on_Intellectual_Property_20030611_(En).pdf. 
 154. Id. at 6.  
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breeding methods, and an analysis of both phenotypic and genotypic 
characteristics.
155
  
Mark Janis and Stephen Smith amply discuss these issues, 
reaching a totally different conclusion. Like Laurence Helfer,
156
 these 
authors insist in particular on the fact that ―phenotypic comparisons 
using traits that were specifically selected by UPOV for DUS 
purposes do not necessarily provide reliable estimates of genetic 
distance or of agronomic performance potential.‖157 They also show 
that new breeding techniques such as doubled haploids (in which 
recombination is reduced)
158
 or reverse genetics tend to reduce the 
lead-time that PVP holders can enjoy.
159
 Thus, Janis and Smith 
recommend the adoption of an unfair competition regime applicable 
to the commercial/agronomic value of plant datasets.
160
  
According to Srinivasan, the notion of EDV (i.e., morphological 
distinctness although the essential characteristics resulting from the 
genotype of the initial variety are retained) shakes the very 
foundations of conventional plant variety protection systems, based 
on morphological (i.e., phenotypic) differences.
161
 As expected, this 
notion has already started to give rise to some litigation. It might be 
worth mentioning here a first judgment on essentially derived 
 
 155. Id. at 13. 
 156. See LAURENCE R. HELFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PLANT VARIETIES: 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS (2004). 
 157. Mark D. Janis & Stephen Smith, Technological Change and the Design of Plant 
Variety Protection Regimes, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1557, 1584 (2007). 
 158. The technique of double haploids aims at creating pure lines. The haploid plants result 
from a male sexual cell or a female sexual cell without fecundation. The plants obtained 
normally have one batch of chromosomes instead of two, which is doubled naturally or 
artificially so that they become fertile. Thus, pure lines are produced in a few months instead of 
the eight to ten years involved in the traditional technique of self-pollination. 
 159. Janis & Smith, supra note 157, at 1604. For an explanation of reverse genetics, see 
Hirohiko Hirochika, Tissue Culture-Induced Mutations and a New Type of Activation Tagging 
as Tools for Functional Analysis of Rice Genes, in RICE IS LIFE: SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY 78 (K. Toriyama, K.L. Heong & B. Hardy eds., 2005), and Gynheung An, 
Functional Genomics by Reverse Genetics, in RICE IS LIFE: SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY, supra, at 76. 
 160. Janis & Smith, supra note 157, at 1607–13. These authors nonetheless note that 
―unfair competition models typically trade away certainty. This is a serious problem in areas 
where there is . . . a strong need for the ex ante allocation of rights to provide third-party notice 
and to hold down transaction costs.‖ Id. at 1612–13. 
 161. C.S. Srinivasan, Exploring the Feasibility of Farmers‘ Rights, 21 DEV. POL‘Y REV. 
419, 429 (2003). 
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varieties, rendered by the Civil Court of The Hague in the 
Netherlands in October 2002. At the provisional stage, the court had 
to assess whether the variety ―Blancanieves‖ of the species 
Gypsophila was a mutant of the variety ―Dangypmini,‖ as claimed by 
the holder of a Community plant certificate on the latter against the 
Netherlands-based holder of another Community plant certificate on 
the former. The court considered that the phenotype of 
―Blancanieves‖ differs from that of ―Dangypmini‖ in several 
characteristics, held to be essential characteristics resulting from the 
genetic material of ―Blancanieves,‖ and not present in 
―Dangypmini.‖162 On July 13, 2005, the court concluded its 
proceedings with a judgment holding that ―Blancanieves‖ was not an 
EDV, as the plaintiff had not convinced the court that these numerous 
and substantial differences could result from simple acts of 
derivation.
163
 It will be interesting to see new cases arise. However, 
as highlighted by Janis and Smith, this decision ―suggests that 
phenotypic characteristics will continue to drive the scope analysis‖ 
and that ―genotype evidence may well be relegated to a role (if any) 
as a potential source of rebuttal evidence on derivation.‖164 
The protection of EDV might limit the ―freedom-to-operate‖ in 
future breeding programs using the protected variety as starting 
material—legally, pursuant to the breeders‘ exemption provided by 
UPOV Article 15.1(iii). Conversely, if a breeder uses a new cultivar 
developed by farmers from landraces and obtains an essentially 
derived variety, the acts of producing, offering for sale, selling, 
importing and exporting or stocking for such purposes this variety 
may require the authorization by the farmers who developed the 
cultivar. Such authorization will be necessary where an application 
for breeders‘ rights was filed by the farmers for their cultivar within 
one or four years (depending on whether the breeder is located in the 
 
 162. For a summary of the provisional judgment provided by Mr. Krieno Fikkert, Secretary 
of the Board for Plant Breeders‘ Rights, Netherlands, see Provisional Judgment on Essentially 
Derived Varieties, PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION (Int‘l Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants, Geneva, Switz.), Dec. 2002, at 7. 
 163. For a summary of the judgment provided by Krieno Fikkert, see Judgment on 
Essentially Derived Varieties (EDVs) (In the First Instance), PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION 
(Int‘l Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Geneva, Switz.), Sept. 2005, at 9–10. 
 164. Janis & Smith, supra note 157, at 1600–01. 
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same country as the farmers or in another country) following the act 
of disposition for purposes of exploitation of the cultivar-owing to the 
UPOV criteria of novelty defined at Article 6.
165
 Thus, the notion of 
essential derivation has to be clarified in relation to that of 
exploitation. 
Indeed, even in situations where essential derivation can be 
established, dependency is not automatic. The ISF has studied the 
case where the initial variety was not protected at the time of the act 
of essential derivation but is granted protection afterwards.
166
 
According to ISF, if the acts of derivation are conducted during the 
grace period but before the date of application, or in between the date 
of application and that of granting, dependency starts on the granting 
date.
167
 Nevertheless, the breeder of the initial variety might be 
entitled to an equitable remuneration based on the provisional 
protection which Article 13 of 1991 UPOV Convention requires 
Contracting Parties to adopt.
168
 This type of protection, which was 
optional under Article 7(3) of the 1978 Act of the UPOV Convention, 
draws from patent regimes, to which we shall now turn. 
However, prior to this, it is necessary to specify that the situation 
of a breeder vis-à-vis either the breeder of the initial variety or vis-à-
vis the patent-holder in a cross-licensing situation is independent 
from whether this second breeder will have to contribute, on a 
compulsory or a voluntary basis, to the MLS. The situation of the 
breeder of an essentially derived/dependent variety has a bearing on 
the MLS only if this derived variety also incorporates material 
accessed from the MLS. In such a situation, if the breeder has to pay 
an equitable remuneration to the first breeder, or a royalty to the 
patent-holder, he or she will most likely try to recoup such fees in 
addition to breeding costs through intellectual property protection.
169
 
 
 165. UPOV, supra note 137, art. 6. 
 166. INT‘L SEED FED‘N, ESSENTIAL DERIVATION FROM A NOT-YET PROTECTED VARIETY 
AND DEPENDENCY (2005), available at http://www.worldseed.org/en-us/international_seed/on_ 
intellectal_property.html. 
 167. Id. 
 168. UPOV, supra note 137, art. 13. 
 169. The second breeder can apply for either a plant variety certificate or a patent, 
depending on the type of subject matter and of protection sought. If the second breeder applies 
for a patent, at least in the European Union, this situation will give rise to cross-licenses. Article 
12 of Directive 98/44 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions provides effectively 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/14
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This is where the breeding of an EDV may have an impact on the 
MLS. Whether this EDV will be available for further breeding or not 
will have to be assessed in order to determine whether the breeder of 
the essentially derived/dependent variety has to contribute to the 
MLS. 
C. The Notion of ―Components‖ 
As already mentioned, Article 12.3(d) of the International Treaty 
states that ―[r]ecipients shall not claim any intellectual property or 
other rights that limit the facilitated access to the plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture, or their genetic parts or 
components, in the form received from the Multilateral System.‖170 
The expression ―genetic parts or components‖ is not defined in the 
SMTA. However, at an early stage of drafting, ―components‖ seems 
to have been understood as meaning ―components containing 
functional units of heredity.‖171 There are numerous elements 
corresponding to such a definition: genes contained in the nucleus of 
the cells of the plant, Expressed Sequenced Tags (―EST‖),172 Single 
Nucleotide Polymorphisms (―SNP‖),173 and the DNA contained in the 
chloroplasts
174
 and the mitochondria
175
 of the plant cells and 
 
for a cross-licensing scheme between patents and plant breeders‘ rights. Council Directive 
98/44, art. 12, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 19–20 (EC). This provision was inspired by the conditions 
listed in Article 31 of the TRIPS (which is concerned only with compulsory licenses on 
patents). TRIPS, supra note 137, art. 31. As a corollary, Council Regulation 873/2004, 2004 
O.J. (L 162) 38 (EC), modifies Article 29 of Council Regulation 2100/94, 1994 O.J. (L 227) 1 
(EC), on Community plant variety rights to organize this cross-licensing scheme with patents in 
the realm of plant variety rights. 
 170. International Treaty, supra note 10, art. 12.3(d). 
 171. Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., Information Pursuant to Rule XXI.1 of the General 
Rules of the Organization, FAO Doc. CL 121/5-Sup.1 (Oct. 20–Nov. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/004/Y6042e.htm. 
 172. An EST is a unique stretch of DNA within a coding region of a gene that serves as a 
landmark for mapping.  
 173. An SNP is a change in which a single base in the DNA of an organism differs from 
the usual base at that position.  
 174. Chloroplasts are organelles (i.e., discrete structures of a cell having specialized 
functions) contained in the cytoplasm of plant cells and responsible for photosynthesis and thus 
existing only in plants and algae. Chloroplast DNA is generally maternally inherited. See 
Phillip McClean, Maternal Inheritance: Structure of Organelle Genomes (1997), http://www. 
ndsu.nodak.edu/instruct/mcclean/plsc431/maternal/maternal3.htm.  
 175. Mitochondria are organelles contained in the cytoplasm of the plant cell (i.e., outside 
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transposons.
176
 Some of these elements may constitute candidate 
subject matter of patents,
177
 whose blocking effect on subsequent 
breeding programs depends on the wording of the claims and the 
interpretation such patent claims receive. Indeed, a search of the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office‘s granted-patent database using 
―chloroplast‖ as a keyword returned 174 patents, and ―transposon,‖ 
191 as of February 4, 2008.
178
 These inventions are concerned with 
―compositions and methods for regulating metabolism in plants,‖179 
insect- and herbicide-resistant plants,
180
 or gene targeting methods, 
among others. 
Thus, where such ―components‖ have been isolated from material 
accessed from the MLS, have shown a function, and have been 
protected by a patent, they will no longer be available without 
restrictions, unless the applicable patent law provides for a research 
exemption. In many jurisdictions (although not the United States), the 
 
the nucleus) that can be found in most eukaryotes and are responsible for the main source of 
energy production, adenosine triphosphate. See Phillip McClean, Plant Genome Organization 
and Structure: Mitochondrial Genome Organization (1998), http://www.ndsu.edu/instruct/ 
mcclean/plsc731/genome/genome8.htm. 
 176. Transposons are sequences of DNA located on chromosomes (i.e., in the nucleus of a 
cell) and have the faculty of ―jumping‖ from one position to another within a given genome, 
causing insertions, deletions and translocations of genes. ―Plant transposons excise imprecisely, 
generally leaving part of the duplication at the former insertion site . . . . [This] commonly 
results in either an altered gene product or a frame-shift mutation.‖ Nina Fedoroff, Transposons 
and Genome Evolution in Plants, 97 PNAS 7002, 7003 (2000), available at http://www.pnas. 
org/; see also Heinz Saedler, Functional Evolution (1998), http://www.mpiz-koeln.mpg.de/ 
english/research/saedlerGroup/saedler/index.html; Wikipedia, Transposon, http://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Transposon (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). Transposons are a reason why the UPOV 
Convention criteria of homogeneity and stability are expressed in terms of percentage. 
 177. This is true only if the usual patentability conditions are met, in particular that of 
utility. In the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has confirmed in In re 
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the non-patentability of ESTs. Judge Rader, in dissent, 
analyzed ESTs as research tools, distinct from the methods (of making a compound having no 
known use) excluded from patentability by the United States Supreme Court in Brenner v. 
Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966). In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1379 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 178. It is noteworthy that no U.S. patent seems to have been applied for by the joint 
FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture, whose aims include 
―speeding up breeding of new crop varieties by increasing the efficiency of mutation . . . using 
molecular markers.‖ NAFA Project, D2, http://www.iaea.or.at/programmes/nafa/d2/index.html 
(last visited May 2, 2008). 
 179. U.S. Patent No. 7,105,718 (filed Mar. 30, 2001). 
 180. U.S. Patent No. 7,129,391 (filed May 15, 1998). 
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subject matter of a patent may be used for further research on
181
 such 
subject matter during the period of protection. 
Moreover, under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the patentee is 
required to deposit samples of the organic material (object or starting 
material of the invention) that cannot be described to a collection 
placed under the Budapest Convention on the international 
recognition of the deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of 
patent procedure
182
 in order to satisfy the requirement of sufficiency 
of description. Depending on the jurisdiction, the patentee may be 
entitled to restrict access to the deposited material, at least for a fixed 
period of time.
183
 However, after the expiry or abandonment of the 
patent, such material automatically falls in the public domain. The 
last sentence of Article 6.9 of the SMTA
184
 is nonetheless useful in 
 
 181. As opposed to ―with‖ such subject matter. 
 182. The World Intellectual Property Organization defines the term ―microorganism‖ in the 
Budapest Treaty as follows: 
The term ‗microorganism‘ is not defined in the Treaty so that it may be interpreted in a 
broad sense as to the applicability of the Treaty to microorganisms to be deposited 
under it. Whether an entity technically is or is not a microorganism matters less in 
practice than whether deposit of that entity is necessary for the purposes of disclosure 
and whether an I[nternational] D[eposit] A[uthority] will accept it. Thus, for example, 
tissue cultures and plasmids can be deposited under the terms of the Treaty, even 
though they are not microorganisms in the strict sense of the word.  
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE DEPOSIT OF MICROORGANISMS UNDER THE 
BUDAPEST TREATY 4 (2009). 
 183. Rule 28 (3) of the Implementing Regulations of the European Patent Convention 
(―EPC‖) makes it a general principle that the ―deposited material shall be available upon 
request to any person from the date of publication of the European patent application.‖ 
Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, R.28(3) (2004), 
available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ma2.html. However, 
Rule 28(4) authorizes the applicant to restrict the availability to the issue of a sample to an 
expert nominated by the requester, either until the publication of the mention of the grant of the 
European patent, or for twenty years from the date of filing if the application has been refused 
or withdrawn. Id. at R.28(4). In any case, as stated in Rule 3(b), such issue shall be made only if 
the requester has undertaken vis-à-vis the applicant not to make the biological or any biological 
material derived therefrom ―available to any third party and to use that material for 
experimental purposes only‖ until the protected material enters the public domain (upon expiry, 
refusal, or withdrawal of the patent). See id. at 28(3). This rule was adopted to allow EPC 
members that are also EC member States to implement Article 13.4 of Council Directive 98/44 
on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions. See Council Directive 98/44, art. 13.4, 
1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 20 (EC).  
 184. SMTA, supra note 29, art. 6.9. This last sentence encourages the recipient to place a 
sample of his/her/its product that incorporates MLS material into a collection that is part of the 
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that this material and the collection where it was deposited may not 
be readily identifiable (unless one goes back to the patent), and not 
always easily accessible. Thus, the addition of an incentive to have 
the material provided directly to the MLS after the termination of the 
protection by intellectual property rights was necessary. Prior to such 
termination, and so long as the products incorporating material 
accessed from the MLS are commercialized in a way restricting 
access to the subject matter, a contribution to the MLS will be 
required. 
Thus, like some open source models, the SMTA relies on the very 
existence of intellectual property rights. It can be argued that the 
SMTA presents features of an open source system, associated with a 
benefit-sharing scheme that constitutes an idiosyncrasy and 
cornerstone of the International Treaty. However, the benefit-sharing 
scheme borrows more from existing copyright collecting societies 
than from open source systems. Thus, the Multilateral System 
instituted by the International Treaty appears to be a legal hybrid, 
drawing from different systems of Commons and open source. 
Moreover, the open source model emulated is, itself, a hybrid through 
which some degree of differentiation between the products is retained 
downstream, allowing the capture of value through the sale of related 
products and contributions to the benefit-sharing scheme on this 
base.
185
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has summarized the coverage of the Standard 
Material Transfer Agreement mechanism of the FAO International 
Treaty, and the potential impact of intellectual property rights on the 
implementation of the benefit-sharing scheme. The SMTA is 
particular in that it organizes transfers of germplasm between public 
 
MLS for research and breeding, after the expiry or abandonment of the protection period of the 
intellectual property right on this product. 
 185. For a discussion of different open source models, see Joel West, How Open Is Open 
Enough? Melding Proprietary and Open Source Platform Strategies, 32 RES. POL‘Y 1259 
(2003), and Joel West, Seeking Open Infrastructure: Contrasting Open Standards, Open Source 
and Open Innovation, 12 FIRST MONDAY (2007), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/ 
index.php/fm/article/view/1913/1795. 
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institutions and private operators, with a view to reducing transaction 
costs. In order to make up for the monitoring expenses involved by 
its implementation, and to generate monetary benefits to be used for 
the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture, the Multilateral System depends on intellectual 
property rights. However, the Multilateral System also proposes some 
mechanisms for procuring non-monetary benefits, such as transfers of 
technology and capacity building. Further, the ambit of the 
International Treaty is wider than that of the Multilateral System. As 
already mentioned, the International Treaty is concerned with the 
conservation of all plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, in 
particular in situ. 
The number of germplasm accessions distributed by international 
and national genebanks was evaluated at approximately 100,000 per 
year.
186
 According to Visser et al., in a scenario where all collections 
of the CGIAR and the national collections of major cereals are 
covered by the FAO Multilateral System, the number of germplasm 
source and destination countries entering bilateral contracts would 
decrease, compared to a situation where there is no MLS, down to 
fifty.
187
 The number of bilateral agreements would amount to two 
hundred to five hundred per year.
188
 In a scenario where eventually 
all food crops would be included in the MLS and bilateral agreements 
would concern only industrial crops, the number of such agreements 
would fall down to twenty to forty per year, between roughly five 
source countries and thirty destination countries.
189
 The cost for each 
agreement—including negotiating, tracking and monitoring the use of 
germplasm—was estimated at $10,000 on average, with the average 
number of plants to be tested per accession amounting to eight.
190
 
This figure represents a fraction of the R&D expenditures incurred by 
 
 186. BERT VISSER ET AL., TRANSACTION COSTS OF GERMPLASM EXCHANGE UNDER 
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 6 (2000), available at http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/206946/ 
gfar0077.pdf. The CGIAR Future Harvest Centres alone distribute over 50,000 samples every 
year. Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., supra note 29, at app. N.1. IRRI alone distributed a little 
less than 43,900 samples in 2007 through 474 SMTAs. 
 187. Visser et al., supra note 186, at 10. 
 188. Id. at 11. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 12, 14. 
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private breeders worldwide, estimated at $1 billion, with $50 million 
allocated to germplasm maintenance.
191
 The amount paid by each of 
the fifty germplasm-importing countries of the first hypothesis would 
reach $100,000. 
The impact of the International Treaty might not be tremendous, 
but the world is better off with it than without it, even though it 
meant compromising farmers‘ rights (which might never have been 
accepted by industrialized countries anyway). The International 
Treaty should enhance conservation efforts at the international level, 
thanks to the network comprised of the Future Harvest Centers and 
the Global Crop Diversity Trust.
192
 This cooperation should help 
channel available funds to real priorities in terms of conservation, 
while reducing the existing duplication of efforts conducted by 
separate collections. It thus goes further for plants used for food and 
agriculture than the CBD does and should help maintain ten times as 
many accessions than the existing CGIAR network. Further, owing to 
the interdependency of all countries regarding access to germplasm, 
global access to food crop germplasm is indeed the most valuable 
feature of the International Treaty. The ability to access germplasm is 
paramount to food security, in order for producers (farmers and 
breeders) to improve varieties—not just their yields, but also their 
agronomic or nutritional particularities—or to hedge against pest or 
disease outbreaks. The International Treaty also has the potential of 
bringing forth more equity in international relations than the CBD, 
 
 191. Id. at 16. 
 192. The Seventh Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, held 
in February 2004, welcomed in its decision VII/3 the concept of this Trust, first floated at the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development. The Global Crop Diversity Trust was set up as an 
international fund under the Agreement for the Establishment of the Global Crop Diversity 
Trust, which entered into force on October 21, 2004 and gathers twenty-six parties as of 
October 2007. See Agreement for the Establishment of the Global Diversity Trust, http://www. 
croptrust.org/main/governance.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). In partnership with the FAO 
and the CGIAR 16 Future Harvest Centers, the Trust aims at gathering the 1,460 genebanks 
existing around the world. This represents an estimated 6 million accessions. The Trust is 
currently trying to raise an endowment of $260 million. Global Crop Diversity Trust, Our 
Mission, http://www.croptrust.org/main/mission.php; see also Geoffrey Hawtin, Interim 
Executive Secretary, Global Corp., The Global Crop Diversity Trust: Purposes, Priorities and 
Governance, Speech at the Symposium on Food Security and Biodiversity: Sharing the Benefits 
of Plant Genetic Resources (Oct. 16, 2004), at 44–45. 
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whose Bonn Guidelines are not binding, or the WTO, as Farmers‘ 
Rights may be reinforced at least through the MLS, to which some 
systematic contributions shall be made in the Trust Account. National 
legislators could adopt incentives for IPRs holders to make such 
contributions. Parties to the International Treaty could and should 
additionally implement Article 9(2) on the protection of traditional 
knowledge or the participation of farmers in the adoption of decisions 
related to the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture, through national sui generis 
regimes taking into account customary rights. 
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